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Abstract 
This article argues in favour of the abolition of gender markers on identity documents. 
Its main goal is to assess the emancipatory dimension of such a proposition not only 
for gender minorities but also for individuals who recognise themselves within 
traditional gender identities. I first discuss the discriminations resulting from the 
practices of binary gender registration for intersex children, trans persons, and non-
conforming individuals. Then, I look at the different deadlocks ensuing from the most 
popular remedy to those discriminations that loosen gender binary by adding one or 
more registration options. I go on to argue that those should lead us to advocate for 
the abolition of gender registration as a “transformative remedy” (Fraser, 1995) for the 
harmful consequences of normative gender regulations and as a way to integrate the 
queer conception of identity within a debate about institutional change and public 
policy. Such a proposition however raises question for feminist politics, since identity 
categories are also tools to achieve rights, equality and reparation on the basis of group 
oppression and specific shared situations. Yet, degendering civil registration could be 
part of a broader claim to a renewed conception of neutrality, not the liberal gender 
blindness, famously criticised by feminists but a neutrality critically reconstructed as 
non-assignation. This alternative neutrality would ask the collective not to assign its 
members to predetermined identities, to try and suspend the will to institutionally 
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In late 2018, Germany became the fifteenth country in the world to undermine the 
binarity of gender registration in civil status and administrative documents by 
enabling individuals who do not recognise themselves in binary identification to 
check the box "diverse." This change comes after a case was brought to the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, highlighting the discrimination faced by intersex 
citizens. Across the globe, the growing number of newly adopted laws and pending 
court cases that demand such legal reforms has added to the growing visibility of 
intersex and gender non-conforming activism that questions the long-held rigidity of 
binary identity categories. It seems that the traditional norms of gender identity are 
becoming more and more inadequate to represent and recognise the flourishing scope 
of gender expressions and identifications. Most interestingly, adding one option of 
gender registration (“diverse”, “other”, “x”, etc.) has been the most common legal 
remedy for this problem. The third box is, for instance, currently available not only in 
Germany but also in Australia, Austria, Uruguay, India, some states of Canada and 
the United States of America. In fact, beyond the legal realm and sometimes before it, 
the tendency to add categories has also pertained to other areas of society such as 
social and dating apps sometimes offering more than 50 boxes of gender identity from 
which to choose.  These issues generally divide public opinion into two camps: those 
favoring the introduction of one or several new categories and those resisting it.2 
Another perspective, however, has remained widely overlooked.3 When the German 
Federal Constitutional Court recognized the discriminatory character of binary 
registration for the intersex plaintiff, it ordered the German parliament to either offer 
a third option of identification on legal documents or suppress the mention of sex on 
those documents altogether. Interestingly, but not so surprisingly considering the 
general trend on this issue, the Bundestag chose the first proposition.  
 
Yet, adding one or several categories of identification does not go without 
difficulties. These challenges lie in the “paradox of rights” (Brown 2000), “dilemma of 
 
2 The constitutional court of France has for instance ruled against the introduction of a third gender 
option in 2017 arguing that gender binary in identity documents “has a legitimate goal and is 
necessary to the juridical and social organisation of which it is a founding element”. My translation. 
« La dualité des énonciations relatives au sexe dans les actes de l’état civil poursuit un but légitime en ce qu’elle 
est nécessaire à l’organisation sociale et juridique, dont elle constitue un élément fondateur ». (Arrêt n°531, 
Cour de Cassation France, May 4th, 2017).  
3 Some activists have advocated for the suppression of gender markers altogether, as well as some 
academic pieces (Davis, 2014; Shrage, 2012), but those arguments have not reached the public sphere 
so far.   
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difference” (Minow 1990, 20) or “conundrum of equality” (Scott, 1988, 202). That is, 
marginalised social groups claim equality based on the identity category that is the 
source of their exclusion. In doing so, they give new meanings to this category but also 
reconduct the social differences they are trying to abolish. The claim to add one or 
more boxes for gender registration in identity documents and administrative forms 
does not escape this emancipation paradox. Such legal change provides gender non-
conforming individuals with more basic human rights while leaving almost 
untouched the widespread gender binary and its discriminatory effects for non-
conforming individuals, intersex children and women. It also perpetrates the 
naturalisation of gender frontiers.  
 
Instead of granting the privilege to have one’s gender identity recognised by 
the state and inscribed in civil status, why not rather attenuate the administrative, 
social, and legal needs to know and display gender identities? The main argument of 
this article is that, confronted with the limits of a third gender option, the only 
remaining solution to discriminatory binary registration is to abolish gender markers 
on identity documents and other kinds of administrative forms. The objective is to 
assess the emancipatory dimension of such a proposition not only for gender 
minorities but also for individuals who recognise themselves within traditional 
gender identities. This article takes the proposition of Patchen Markell seriously when 
he wrote, that "faced with a relation of privilege or subordination, look for the way to 
dismantle or attenuate the privilege itself before (or while also) working to include a 
determinate group of previously excluded people under its protection” (Markell, 
2003, p. 181).   
 
In the following sections, I first discuss the discriminations resulting from the 
practices of gender registration for intersex gender non-conforming individuals. I 
understand gender non-conforming as a social situation relative to the current norms 
of gender. This situation concerns people whose gender expressions do not fit the 
normative conception of gender identities, who identify in as gender diverse or non-
binary, or whose ambiguous body disrupt the daily assignation of gender. Then, I look 
at the drawbacks of the solution to those discriminations that consists in adding a third 
option of gender identification. I go on to argue that these drawbacks should lead us 
to advocate for the abolition of gender registration as a “transformative remedy” 
(Fraser, 1995) for the harmful consequences of normative gender regulations.  
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I then explore how the abolition of gender registration sheds new lights on two 
existing debates in queer and feminist scholarship. The first one relates to the 
discussions on the compatibility between queer politics and social transformation 
through legal and institutional ways. I suggest that abolishing gender registration is 
one of the ways to integrate a queer conception of identity within a debate about the 
law and public policy. The second debate concerns the role of identity categories in 
feminist emancipatory politics. Following the feminist arguments on the “paradox of 
rights”(Brown, 2000) and the “dilemma of difference” (Minow, 1990, 20), the main risk 
of abolishing gender registration would be to reenact a norm of institutional gender-
blindness, akin to “colorblindness” on issue of race. This norm of gender-blindness 
conceals rather than reduces gender inequalities. I argue, instead, that abolishing 
gender registration should be part of a broader claim for a renewed and feminist 
conception of neutrality, critically reconstructed as non-assignation. This renewed 
neutrality asks the collective not to assign predetermined identities to its members, to 
suspend the institutional and administrative will to identify individuals according to 
collective categories, and not to construct distinctive groups. The main objective is to 
de-gender the institutions and laws that organise our collective life.  
 
Gender binary registration is discriminatory 
 
Gender registration is part of the broader system of identity assignation and norm 
enforcement that reproduces the gender division of the social world in most Western 
countries.4 Gender identities are constructed through different social institutions that 
require individuals to situate themselves on one side of the gender frontier. Since the 
18th century, especially, the development of science has expanded the possibilities to 
verify, classify, and identify individuals' gender identity (Foucault, 1980). It has 
reinforced the naturalised and biological approach to gender and rendered it difficult 
to escape or fool its regulation. The progress of science, with the expansion of the 
modern administrative state and its specific type of governability, displaced the 
conception of gender identity and provided doctors and administrators with authority 
to verify and decide the gender of an individual, leaving less – if any –  room for 
gender self-determination (Foucault, 1980). Those modern practices of medical and 
institutional gender identification enforce the gender binary.  
 
4 I focus here in on the issue of third gender as it has emerged in western countries’ public sphere 
destabilising the long lasting western hegemonic conception of gender binary. Non-binary 
individuals and identities are part of traditional cultures in other part of the world. In most countries, 
however, non-binary individuals and communities still face some kind of social stigma, 
marginalisation or violence (Diehl et al., 2017).  




Gender in fact, is not only the social aspect of sex. The biologist Anne Fausto 
Sterling has showed that “labelling someone a man or a woman is a social decision” 
(Fausto-Serling, 2000, p.3). This social decision is always informed and oriented by 
contingent and cultural beliefs on gender. Those beliefs, according to Sterling, “define 
our sex” and “affect what kind of knowledge scientists produce about sex in the first 
place." (Fausto Sterling, 2000, p. 3).  The sex binary is, in this sense, a social and 
political construction based on the multiple biological, physiological, gonadal, 
chromosomal, hormonal variations of human sexuality (Fausto-Serling, 2000). If sex 
itself is a social and medical construction, then the divide between, on the one hand, 
a natural, biological sex and, on the other, a social and cultural gender becomes 
irrelevant5. In this perspective, gender is a norm that divides our sense of the world 
into two different categories. It is an epistemological lens, a "grid of legibility" through 
which we see and understand the social world, recognise certain phenomena, 
practices, and bodies while rejecting others in the domain of the unrecognisable, and 
unreal (Butler, 2004, 42). As human beings, we are always gendered in some way, 
situated and understood by others in relation to the gender frontier. The social 
regulation of the gender norm consists of a series of repeated acts of intersubjective 
and institutional assignation that take place through administrative procedures and 
public spaces. Gender registration is, indeed, one, if not the first, of those institutional 
regulations. These regulations, however, are not costless. 
 
Reassignment surgeries performed on newborns presenting a variation of the 
sexual development exemplify the constructed character of the binary conception of 
sex and gender. But they also highlight the role of gender registration in the painful 
enforcement of this conception. Indeed, those medical interventions happen partly 
because declaring a baby’s gender is needed to let them enter the world as a human 
being. When the established phrase "it is a boy/it is a girl" stumbles over a seemingly 
ambiguous body, it calls into question the binarity of gender. To fix the ambiguity and 
make them fit the dualism, doctors still correct the deviant bodies with chirurgical re-
assignation and hormonal therapy.6 As Judith Butler puts it, their scalpel becomes the 
“knife of the norm” (Butler, 2004). These surgeries are profoundly costly for those who 
endure them. They leave painful traces and scars on the body but also on individuals' 
 
5 This is why, throughout this paper, I use the terms “gender” and “sex” interchangeably.  
6 For now, and to the best of my knowledge, there exists no precise national data on the number of 
those medically unnecessary surgeries performed each year. Yet, several reports agree that despite 
being increasingly denounced by international organisations and NGOs, those surgeries still happen 
in, for instance, France (Blondin, Bouchoux, 2017), the US (Human Rights Watch, 2017), Germany and 
Denmark (Amnesty International, 2017).  
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sense of self and potentialities for bearable life, reproduction and sexual pleasure 
(Amato, 2016; Chase, 1998; Jones, 2017). The reflections and claims of intersex and 
queer activists and theorists show us not only the normative power exercised on those 
bodies that cannot conform to the norm but also the regulatory productions of gender 
performed on any new-born. Babies are recognised as boys and girls as much as they 
are called upon this gender. 
 
Yet, the medical violence imposed on intersex babies is not the sole cost of those 
institutional regulations of gender. For gender non-conforming individuals, the 
gender binary also renders life among others and within institutions extremely 
challenging.  Retaining identity documents that do not reflect your lived identity and 
gender expression complicate administrative acts such as registering for school or 
getting social welfare. It exposes non-conforming individuals to the discretion of 
administrative agents responsible for verifying people's identities in a variety of 
contexts. Heath Fogg Davis tells the enlightening story of a trans woman of colour 
who was denied access to a public bus in the city of Philadelphia (USA) because of her 
gender expression. Her public transit pass indicated "F," and the driver judged that 
she did not present in a womanly enough way and refused her boarding. But the same 
problem also arose when she presented a transit pass indicating “M” to another driver 
who decided that she could not be a man and denied her again the right to use public 
transportation (Davis, 2014). 
 
Beyond the administrative turmoil hampering access to public services and 
social insertion, the lack of official recognition of one’s identity can also cause 
significant psychological and emotional damages. Axel Honneth has underlined the 
social harms resulting from suffering a lack of collective positive understanding of 
one's form of life. For him, “the result of the evaluative degradation of certain patterns 
of self-realization is that they cannot relate to their mode of life as something of 
positive significance within their community.” This leads to a “loss of personal self-
esteem, of the opportunity to regard themselves as beings whose traits and abilities 
are esteemed” (Honneth, 1995, 134). These types of degradation apply, for instance, to 
ways of experiencing identity, love, sex and kinship that are depreciated and 
marginalised by mainstream gender norms. But in the cases of intersex and non-
binary individuals, there might be an even more pressing claim than to have one’s 
ways of life – here gender identity - positively recognised. To be depreciated, 
marginalised or oppressed "means that you already exist as a subject of some kind" 
(Butler, 2004, 218).  In the current legal and institutional organisation of gender, 
intersex and non-binary individuals are, in fact, unreal. Their existence is 
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unintelligible. And the consequence of finding “that one is fundamentally 
unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and of language find one to be an 
impossibility)” is “to find that one has not yet achieved access to the human […]It is 
to find that one’s language is hollow, and that no recognition is forthcoming because 
the norms by which recognition takes place are not in one’s favor” (Butler, 2004, 218). 
The stake here is to not only to be positively – or equally – recognised but to be 
recognised at all. 
 
The binary character of gender registration, I have argued, enforces the gender 
norm on new-borns presenting some variations of sexual development. However, it 
is also discriminatory for individuals – intersex or not - who do not recognise 
themselves or are not recognised by others in one of the two socially accepted genders 
and who therefore have difficulty being recognised by public agents and institutions 
and access fundamental civic and social rights.  
 
The pitfalls of the “other” box 
 
In order to remedy this lack of recognition, certain countries have introduced the 
option to check “other”, “diverse” or “third gender” on identity documents and 
administrative forms. Yet, shortcomings emerge when the law sets particular criteria 
to access this new category. In Germany for instance, the agreement of a physician is 
needed to check the box "diverse," meaning that only people who are medically 
recognised as presenting variations of the sexual development can claim this new 
administrative identity. As the state indeed offers an alternative option to gender 
binary, those types of conditions re-naturalise gender identities. The reform in fact 
consisted in adding one gender to the two already scientifically and biologically 
recognised genders. The conditions set up by the German law naturalise and 
pathologize gender non-conforming identities. It does this by negating the lived 
identity of persons who—not intersex—identify nor as either male or female. The 
proliferation of biological sexes will not be of much help for those suffering 
discriminations due to the incongruency between their assigned and lived gender 
identity. It just creates another medical box to assign new-borns presenting 
ambivalent genitalia, displacing instead of subverting the naturalized norms of 
gender identity. Under this criterion, adding a box just reinforces the common belief 
that one’s gender is reducible to a doctor’s assessment of one’s sexual organs and 
bodies. 




Even in the cases of more liberal practices where no previous conditions are 
required to be recognised as a member of the “third”, “other” or “diverse” gender 
some problems remain. In Argentina, for instance, individuals can choose to be 
registered according to the gender of their choices (female, male, or any other 
appellations) without having to prove any specific medical certification. Letting 
people decide for themselves seems at least a more rightful option in terms of 
autonomy and self-determination. Nevertheless, it does not alleviate the burden of 
marginality to gender non-conforming individuals. Adding an exception to the binary 
gender system will solely confirm the rules that the dual dimension of sexual identity 
is and should remain the norm. It would undoubtedly help non-conforming 
individuals to navigate administrative life more smoothly while reducing the 
numbers of reassignation surgeries on intersex babies, but it is not likely to enhance 
the general cultural evaluation of their forms of life.  
 
What would be the reaction of an employer or a school headmaster or teacher 
in front of the application of a candidate presenting a "third gender" civil status? Those 
stigmas weighting on bodies and subjectivities that do not recognise themselves 
within traditional dual identities would most likely be left untouched, even if they are 
legally recognised. The third gender option is not likely to generate the types of 
intersubjective relationships that “inspire not just passive tolerance but felt concern 
for what is individual and particular about the other person” (Honneth, 1995, 129). 
Gender non-conforming individuals might become legally legible, but they will still 
be oppressed. In Bangladesh for instance, and despite the differences in the cultural 
conceptions of gender, Adnan Hossain has identified the paradox entailed in the state 
recognition of hijras. He argues that the introduction of a third legal gender has not 
done much to the social stigma weighting on those traditionally non-binary 
individuals and has increased their regulation and disciplinarisation by 
administrative and medical institutions. (Hossain, 2017).  
 
In fact, the issue raised by the introduction of third options of identification 
echoes the paradox of identity specific rights theorised by Wendy Brown (Brown, 
2000). Discussing the necessity and limitations of legal battles for feminist politics, 
Brown argues that when they are targeting specific social groups, rights may be as 
hindering as they are protective. She writes that “to have a right as a woman is not to 
be free of being designated and subordinated by gender. Rather it may entail some 
protection from the most immobilizing features of that designation, it re-inscribes the 
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designation as it protects us, and thus enables our further regulation through that 
designation” (Brown, 2000, 232).  Here, the problem applies to gender non-conforming 
individuals. The introduction of a third gender might well grant them access to basic 
rights, but it will also re-inscribe them in an assigned identity and provide the legal 
grounds for further regulations based on this identity. Those regulations could be 
social and take the form of moral and physical harassment, sexual violence, and 
discrimination. They could also be legally organised and deny access to marriages and 
parenthood, especially in those countries where family law is still strongly structured 
around normative heterosexuality. In 2019, the French parliament has adopted a Bill 
extending the right to medically assisted procreation to all women (including single 
mothers and lesbian couples) but did not extend the right to individuals who can be 
pregnant but are not legally “women” according to their identity documents, like 
trans men or non-binary persons with a functioning uterus7. It remains very much 
uncertain whether such a right would be accessible to persons who check the “third 
gender” option if this were to ever become available in France.  
 
As Brown remarks, the risk with specific rights is that they “are never deployed 
‘freely’ but always within a discursive, hence normative context, precisely the context 
in which “woman” (and any other identity category) is iterated and reiterated” 
(Brown, 2000, 232). The context here is one where gender is naturalised, biologically 
determined and conceived as a crucial aspect of one's subjectivity and physical 
embodiment, capable of providing necessary information on who one is and what 
should be one's place in the world. The norms regulating gender identity are not only 
naturalised and rigidly conceived, but they also operate in a very hierarchical 
understanding. Gender categorisation and assignation rely on cultural norms that sort 
individuals into two groups and allocate them different values and social worth. In 
Western languages and discursive practices, the binary opposition male/female refers 
not only to a strictly physiological difference but always entails a broader set of 
oppositions (i.e., active/passive, universal/particular). As Joan Scott argues 
“oppositions rest on metaphors and cross-references, and often in patriarchal 
discourse, sexual difference (the contrast masculine/feminine) serves to encode or 
establish meanings that are literally unrelated to gender or the body. In that way, the 
meanings of gender become tied to many kinds of cultural representations, and these, 
in turn, establish terms by which relations between women and men are organized 
and understood" (Scott, 1988, 37). Not only are those oppositions constructed as 
mutually exclusive, but they give primacy to the values affiliated with the masculine. 
 
7 Projet de loi relatif à la bioéthique, n°2658, Assemblée Nationale, France, 2020.  




Moreover, the gender norms establishing a clear separation between male and 
female identities also involves a heteronormative dimension. In other words, being a 
real man or a real woman not only means performing the expression and embodiment 
associated with masculinity or femininity, but it also implies engaging in sexual and 
emotional relationships with partners of the opposite sex ( Butler 1999). Consequently, 
the comprehension and recognition of a “third” or “other” option will necessarily be 
affected by this hierarchical and heteronormative context where men and masculine 
values as well as heterosexual forms of life occupy a dominating position. The right to 
a third option on identity documents cannot escape this discursive, and as put by 
Brown, normative context. Even though this right was framed as to make the access to 
the third option as opened as possible, such context would inform the social, legal, 
and administrative ways in which this category would be processed and regulated. 
 
Beyond the number of gender boxes available on administrative documents, 
the problem might lie in the administrative regulation of gender itself. For instance, 
the possibility already introduced by many Western countries to switch one’s 
administrative identity to the opposite gender surely fixes some discriminations faced 
by trans persons who pass well and who have no difficulty in being recognised in their 
lived identities. It can also give them the emotional relief of official collective 
recognition. However, this opportunity can still cause administrative deadlocks and 
recognition inadequacy for trans people in transitions with non-conforming gender 
expressions. The identification of gender on identity documents and administrative 
forms often “out” transgender people “which renders them vulnerable to public 
harassment, humiliation and physical violence” ((Davis, 2014, 51). For Davis, “the 
political harm of sex classification policies is that they transfer the crucial and deeply 
personal matter of sexual identity to administrative agents who then have the power 
to use their normative ideas about gender to deprive people of their civil right to use 
the public accommodations under their watch.” (Davis, 2014, 48).  
 
The effects of this transfer of power fall even more harshly on gender non-
conforming persons from social marginalised economic or racialised groups who 
often lack the various resources to access physical and legal official transitions. Those 
groups are in most Western countries also more likely to be subjected to 
administrative and police identity and physical checks and to face sex-segregated 
institutions like prisons or shelters. Dean Spade has shown how the constant exposure 
of trans individuals (especially trans persons of colour and trans migrants) to various 
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forms of gender classification, regulation and segregations through administrations 
and state institutions increases their vulnerability to violence, marginalisation and 
criminalisation (Spade, 2015, xiii).  Introducing another category to existing binary 
gender classifications, just like loosening the conditions to change one’s gender, will 
not reduce the power given to those different administrative agents and institutions 
to regulate vulnerable populations based, among other features, on gender 
expectations and norms. It will make administratively legible a certain population but 
will not reduce their exposition to administrative control and regulations.  
 
Adopting additional identification categories, therefore, involves serious 
potential problems. Those problems have to do with overly specific rights for 
members of marginalised groups in a context of normative gender regulations and to 
the extensive power given to administrative agents and institutions in those 
regulations. In this case, the addition of a third gender option runs the risks of 
reinforcing the barriers between identities, re-naturalising gender and doing little to 
prevent the marginalisation of individuals who check this third gender option. 
Moreover, it does not disturb the rigidity of sexual division and its discriminatory 
consequences for all genders. 
 
Queering institutions by abolishing gender registration  
 
Confronted with these limits, why not instead advocate for the abolishment of gender 
registration on identity documents and administrative forms altogether and go with 
Markell’s advice that, in situations of privileges and inequalities, “sometimes less may 
be more”? (Markell, 2003, 181) In fact, this proposition resembles the kind of strategies 
deployed by queer theorists and activists who aim at destabilising the traditional 
categories of gender and sexuality in opposition to gay identity politics and the types 
of feminism that claims social recognition for female identity and values  (Fraser, 1995) 
This solution would fall into the category of what Nancy Fraser has called 
"transformative remedies" to injustice (Fraser, 1995). Distinct from affirmative 
remedies that “aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements 
without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them”, the goal of 
transformative remedies is to fight inequalities by “restructuring the underlying 
generative framework” (Fraser, 1995, 82). The remedies described by Fraser in a 
discussion about different types of injustice also differ in the effects they produce. 
While the affirmative ones will value the specificities of different social groups and 
the frontiers between them, the transformative remedies would “change everyone’s 
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sense of belonging, affiliation, and self” by “destabilizing existing group identities and 
differentiations” (Fraser, 1995, 83). There is a similar contrast between the two 
alternatives to binary gender registration. While the addition of a third option would 
balance inequalities without disturbing group frontiers and classifications, the 
suppression of gender boxes registration aims, on the contrary, at blurring the 
processes of categorisation and hence the hierarchical organisation of gender 
identities.  
 
Abolishing gender registration would also be a way to bridge the gap between 
the contribution of feminist and queer theories to the conceptions of gender identity 
and normative political theory. In contrast to gay identity politics that aim at legal 
equality and social recognition for sexual minorities, queer politics focus on individual 
bodies and marginal communities that destabilise traditional women/men, 
hetero/homo distinctions. In this sense, they often go beyond the quest for equality for 
gays and lesbians and seek to deconstruct the hegemonic norms of gender and 
sexuality that produce the oppression and marginalisation of people who cannot 
conform to those norms (Kosofsky Sedgwick, 1993, Butler, 1999). However, queer 
theorists rarely provide practical insight as how to transform the institutions that 
produce those distinctions and norms - except by critiquing them, certainly, a crucial 
step to achieve any kind of change. They are in fact often reluctant to formulate 
normative claims and specific political projects that can take form in public policies.  
 
One of the reasons for this reluctance, argues Lisa Duggan, is the gap between 
the language of queer studies and politics and the language of liberal politics. Queer 
politics' rhetoric of socially constructed, fluid and moving sexual practices and gender 
embodiments leave the “politics of the state” to “lesbian and gay civil rights 
strategies” that focus on the affirmation of specific groups and identities (Duggan, 
1994, 6). Duggan has argued that queer intellectuals should, however, concentrate on 
the "creative production of strategies at the boundary of queer and nation-strategies 
specifically for queering the state” (Duggan, 1994, 3). She claims that queer rhetoric 
and language are too remote from the polished and liberal language of politics. I 
would add that part of this mutual disinterest is also due to the queer conception of 
gender and sexual identities – socially constructed and potentially fluid – in a context 
where the language of institutions and politics is in many ways determined by appeal 
to relations of recognition and rigid identity categories (Markell, 2003). Because the 
state is shaped by relations of recognition with several communities to which it allows 
rights and privileges, dominated groups are bound to voice their political claims for 
equality through the prism of identity and recognition (Markell, 2003, 184). 
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Accordingly, the more intelligible political strategy for gender non-conforming 
individuals seeking social and political equality is to ask for the addition of the third 
option in civil registration, unless we subvert – or queer – the broader institutional 
understanding of gender identity.  
 
Giving up in front of those discursive incompatibilities between queer feminist 
politics and institutional change would indeed have significant unwanted 
consequences. Being intelligible within institutions does allow one to exist politically 
and socially. How could one resist legal and institutional translation for one’s form of 
life when the numerous conditions of a livable life depend on it? Yet, how to translate 
the queer language that shapes and celebrates indeterminate, fluid and changing 
identities and experiences of gender and sexual politics into the fixed and determining 
language of mainstream politics and social transformations? 
 
The abolition of gender registration could, in this sense, be a way to start 
inscribing within collective practices the denaturalisation of gender and questioning 
the need for fixed and determined gender boxes. It would do so without using the 
peculiar language of identity fluidity and multiplicity but also without introducing 
new forms of gender regulation as does the addition of a third option. In other words, 
degendering civil registration will make more audible the queer critique of identity 
and participate in the "disestablishment" of gender classification and segregation. 
Discussing the debate on sexual diversity in the USA, Duggan suggested translating 
queer language into an audible argument for mainstream politics. She offers to 
“borrow and transform” the liberal discourse of religion disestablishment, for the 
exception that the religion in question would be "the religion of heteronormativity" 
(Duggan, 1994, 9). In this way, the non-neutrality of policies, law, and institutions 
would appear more partial and unfair. I argue that we can go even further and ask 
than the state not only avoid establishing any "state sexuality" but also have no 
legitimacy in establishing and enforcing the gender frontier (Duggan, 1994, 9).  
 
Blindness vs. non-assignation: Rethinking state neutrality  
 
Yet, doesn't this proposition look like the neutral gesture of liberalism, its historical 
advocacy for state blindness to identities and differences disguised into a queer 
proposition? Aren't identity categories also tools to achieve rights, equality, and 
reparation based on group oppression and specific shared situations? How can 
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abolishing gender registration be part of an emancipatory project for intersex, trans 
and non-conforming individuals, but also for women?   
 
In the following section, I argue that the abolition of gender registration does 
not imply the end of conflictual politics based on experiences of domination. Instead, 
it can be part of a broader feminist project to degender institutions and alleviate the 
individual and collective needs to comply with norms that are hindering for all 
genders. After discussing the limits of granting rights based on specific categories, we 
face, in fact, the other side of the problem. Brown reminds us that if category-oriented 
rights re-inscribe individuals in assigned identities, too general ones can conceal and 
reconduct social relations of subordination. The “paradox of rights” (Brown, 2000), 
also called “conundrum of equality” (Scott, 1988, 202) or “dilemma of difference” 
(Minow, 1990, 20) has been the center of an extensive feminist scholarship spotting the 
limits of both gender neutrality and specific protective rights for women. Minow 
summarises the dilemma in the following way:  
The stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on 
it. Decisions about education, employment, benefits, and other opportunities in 
society should not turn on an individual's ethnicity, disability, race, gender, 
religion, or membership in any other group about which some have deprecating 
or hostile attitudes. Yet, refusing to acknowledge these differences may make 
them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but not 
others, in mind. The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating 
members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by 
treating the two groups differently. (Minow, 1990, 20) 
 
When, in order to preserve individual liberties, the state claims to be neutral, its 
institutions protect and even reinforce a series of power relations organised around 
socially significant group categories. The argument is twofold.  
 
On the one hand, inaction – not to act on those categories – equates 
participating to the perpetuation of discrimination since the law, even when it is silent, 
authorise certain kind of practices and participates in the fabrication and maintenance 
of social order. In other words, state blindness problematically implies that “the 
status-quo general social and economic arrangements are natural and desirable.” 
(Minow, 1990, 70) Hence, the distribution of places, roles, and privileges are seen as 
neutral, as the result of intrinsic features of differences (gender and race, for instance) 
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or mere consequences of individual free choices. As rightly noted by Minow, many 
commentators have considered “affirmative action as nonneutral, compared with the 
status quo treatments of race and gender in employment and other distributions of 
societal resources” (Minow, 1990, 71).  
 
Yet, those social differences are anything but natural and neutral. They are the 
social and material products of old – and less old – statutory differences and economic 
relations of subordination previously entrenched in law. These limits of general liberal 
rights have been often discussed by Marxist commentators of liberalism, “rights 
differentially empower different social groups, depending upon their ability to enact 
the power that a right potentially entails […] the more social resources and the less 
social vulnerability one brings to the exercise of a right, the more power that exercise 
will reap, whether the right at issue is sexual freedom, private property, speech, or 
abortion” (Brown, 2000, 232). 
 
On the other hand, the discourse of the law itself is rarely neutral. How can it 
be neutral “in a world that is not itself neutral?” (Minow, 1990, 44). Legal norms, 
public policies, and social institutions are colored by the interests and practices of 
those who shaped them – usually white, wealthy, heterosexual men. As Spade argues, 
“even though explicit racial and gender exclusions are less frequently written into law 
today, ideas about race and gender are commonly mobilized to support a general 
policy or program that may not explicitly target a group on its face, but that still 
accomplishes its racist/sexist purpose.” (Spade, 2015, 59) Spade gives here the example 
of the suppression and budget-cut of certain welfare programs in the USA based on 
the mobilisation of the negative image of “‘welfare queen’ – portrayed as Black single 
mothers ‘cheating’ the welfare system” (Spade, 2015, 59). 
 
Another famous example of this type of colouration is the differential social 
and economic worth often inscribed in law and public policy attributed to certain 
types of occupations and jobs. Because they have been historically performed by 
women – and still are, often by women of marginalised groups - and associated with 
femininity, some occupations are indeed still not recognised as worthy of decent 
salaries and respect. Those occupations generally revolve around practices of care for 
other more dependent human beings – children, people with disabilities, the elderly, 
etc. Yet, should the social worth of those occupations be reassessed because they are 
performed by women or associated with feminine values and take the risk of 
reconducting this association while we celebrate it? Or because they are, as care 
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theorists have shown, intrinsically valuable for our societies, necessary for the 
wellbeing of our communities and way more vital than most of the profit-generating 
and generously paid activities and jobs (Tronto, 2013)? Gender norms produce a value 
system that favours social goods, activities and values associated with the category of 
man and the masculine while devaluating those associated with femininity or with 
the subversion of gender binaries. This value system organises our institutions and 
economy and imposes expectations and norms on individuals. Yet, should we try to 
neutralise the effects of this value system by revaluing the feminine part of it, or, by 
destabilising its binary? We start to see here a third way between the obliviousness of 
gender blindness and the pitfalls of group-specific rights for women and non-
conforming individuals. 
 
This third way would consist, in a more ambitious and emancipatory 
conception of neutrality as a practice of non-assignation.  In the mainstream 
understanding of neutrality as blindness, equality takes the form of "deliberate 
indifference to specified differences", a commitment to the idea that certain differences 
exist (gender, race, religion, class, etc.) but should not determine access to equal rights 
(Scott, 2002, 44). Those differences are considered apolitical, the consequences, we 
have seen, of either embedded qualities or individual choices. As long as access to 
rights and social goods are not explicitly determined along gender rules, the legal 
system and institutions are considered to be neutral. On the contrary, neutrality as 
non-assignation would recognise the role of institutions and legal arrangements in the 
harmful production of social identities, in the regulation and normalisation of our 
conception and experiences of femininity, masculinity and the rigid frontier between 
the two. It would acknowledge that the gender registration of individuals at birth, the 
segregation of public bathrooms or the widespread habits to divide a group of pupils 
based on gender are not mere assessments of physical differences or benign and 
convenient teaching practices. . These practices, in fact, are all part of the performative 
social reconstruction of the gender frontier. They repeatedly divide the world 
according to two sexes. Neutrality as non-assignation recognises the role of those 
various types of social regulations in the institution of gender as a structuring social 
norm and the production of gender identities and hierarchies 
 
This neutrality as non-assignation consists of actively degendering social 
institutions. It requires interrupting the repeated presence of gender institutional 
regulations which are most of the time unnecessary, and it can start with the 
abolishment of gender registration on civil identification documents and other kinds 
of administrative forms. In fact, degendering civil documents will undoubtedly help 
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to make obsolete any family law organised alongside the gender lines. How can we 
forbid marriages, adoption, and medically assisted reproduction to same-sex couples, 
if identity documents do not indicate individuals' gender?8 It could also delegitimise 
those everyday segregations that organise social spaces and experiences, from public 
bathrooms to school life.9 It would contribute to the denaturalisation of gender 
divisions and classifications that remind us all the time that we are gendered human 
beings and that gender is and should be a crucial aspect of our social and political life. 
As Spade argues, following James C. Scott arguments, “the terms and categories used 
in the classification of data gathered by the state do not merely collect information 
about pre-existing types of things, but rather shape the world into those categories 
that, ultimately, are taken for granted by most” (Spade, 2015, 76). 
 
Of course, abolishing gender registration in administration forms and identity 
documents will not solve once and for all gender discriminations targeting women, 
trans, intersex and gender non-conforming individuals. It will not magically stop 
physical and verbal violence based on gender norms, nor will it resolve the economic, 
social, and political marginalisation faced by women and non-conforming individuals 
of economically and racially dominated groups. Gender functions as a regulatory 
norm in most social interactions and spaces and its impacts exceeds the realm of legal 
and administrative rules. Gender regulations often have no administrative or 
institutional purpose and take the form of gendered education in primary and 
secondary spaces of socialisation, discriminations in school, family and the workplace, 
or verbal and physical harassment of women, transgender, and non-conforming 
individuals in all kinds of social situations.  
 
Yet the social norms that trigger those intersubjective forms of gender 
regulations are shaped by institutional arrangements. In other words, institutions like 
gender registration organise collective reality and determine which embodiments and 
experiences of gender are socially recognisable and acceptable.  In fact, institutions 
constitute “the essential mediation between individuals and historical collectives: it’s 
them that determine the formation of subjectivity, the mode of “their interpellations 
as subjects”, as Althusser used to say, and that determine therefore the behaviors of 
 
8 Another critical way to dismantle the heteronormativity of kinship regulations would be to 
dissociate parental rights from biological ties and allow partners to adopt each other’s children. 
9 For an expanded argument for the desegregation of public bathrooms and other similar types of 
facilities and especially against the safety argument for segregation, see Beyond trans: does gender 
matter?, chapter 2 (Davis, 2017). 
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exclusion and inclusion, recognition and discrimination” (Balibar, 2016, 23).10 Gender 
markers on birth certificates and administrative documents give legitimacy and 
validity to other types of gender segregation and regulation, to the “constant work of 
differentiation to which men and women have never ceased to be subject and which 
leads them to distinguish themselves by masculinizing or feminizing themselves”, 
“the endlessly renewed social (re)construction of the principles of vision and division 
that generate genders” (Bourdieu, 2001, 84). Social norms, just as assumptions about 
the different categories that constructs a particular society shapes the legal rules and 
institutions of that particular society just as legal rules and institutions participate to 
the reproduction, legitimisation and naturalisation of those norms and categories. 
 
I still have to answer two worries that my claim for neutrality as non-
assignation is likely to engender among readers who are both diversity-friendly and 
concerned with social justice. The first relates to the potentiality of grounding legal 
and social struggles against gender discrimination without any kind of possible data 
on the existing social dynamics of gender. How could we know if desegregating 
institutions and suspending assignation work if we have no way to assess the state of 
gender relations and the position of women and non-conforming individuals, in, say, 
the labor market or the education system? Gender discriminations in the professional 
world, sexual violence, gender-based harassment will not end with state registration. 
However, anti-discriminations provisions generally do not need identity documents 
to be legally enforced. Similarly, abolishing gender registration does not necessarily 
mean refusing to produce surveys assessing the current state of gender equality – or 
lack thereof – in one field or another. What neutrality as non-assignation asks instead 
is to limit as much as possible the regular and unnecessary social enforcement of 
gender categories, to negotiate social spaces where gender is not a salient aspect of 
one’s identity and life around others. Why not, for instance, imagine that surveys and 
forms would ask people to disclose their gender only when their goal is specifically to 
find out about inequalities? They could also ask open questions instead of offering 
boxes to choose from.  
 
But do we really want gender not to be a salient aspect of our identity? And 
this relates directly to the second concern and the widely shared fear that degendering 
(in the sense of abolishing some of the institutional, spatial, and legal enforcement of 
 
10 My translation: « L’institution constitue ainsi « la médiation essentielle entre les individus et les 
collectivités historiques : c’est elle qui détermine la formation de leur subjectivité, le mode de leur 
« interpellation en sujets » comme disait Althusser, et qui détermine par contrecoup leurs 
comportements d’inclusion et d’exclusion réciproque, de reconnaissance et de discrimination ». 
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gender) will likely produce androgynous sameness. I believe that this fear, well 
entrenched in the conservative criticism of feminist and queer politics is no more than 
a reverse idle fantasy. The goal of this renewed neutrality is indeed to transform the 
well-polished – and hierarchically organised - social diversity of state-blindness into a 
more joyful and less confining multiplicity. One of the reasons is that gender as an 
understanding of someone’s embodiment, and experiences of masculinity and 
femininity are not likely to disappear altogether, nor is the traditional types of gender 
expressions and identities. What a commitment to a principle of neutrality as non-
assignation wishes instead is a world that leaves more leeway for flexible 
combinations, variations, and juxtapositions in gender experiences, practices, and 
embodiments.  
 
What degendering institutions and law finally implies is to question our own 
relation to identity and its role in our everyday interactions with others. It suggests 
that we try and get rid of what Foucault in a different context has called ‘the morality” 
of “bureaucrats” and “police” (morale d’état-civil), the desire to know and classify 
ourselves and others according to fixed and intelligible social identities (Foucault, 
1972). Of course, as we have seen, in a world where identity matters so much, it seems 
inevitable that gender diverse individuals will formulate their claim for equality as 
claims for recognition of their particular gender identities. In debates about equal 
recognition, however, "identity is understood specifically as an antecedently given set 
of facts about who we are and as a set of facts which both precedes and governs our 
action, telling us what acting “authentically” means for us” (Markell, 2003, 12). For 
Markell this conception of identity and the claim for recognition lies in a will for 
sovereignty, a desire to secure our interactions with others based on what we know, 
or think to know, about their identities and ours. In fact, the appeal to identity 
categories can be seen as a means to ensure power and agency in a social world where 
our encounter with others can hurt, impede us or alter our very sense of who we are. 
The proposition to degender identity documents and the broader call for a renewed 
conception of neutrality as non-assignation entail to recognise this unpredictable, and 
even vulnerable, dimension of social life. It forces us to ask ourselves, what do we risk 
– and what do we lose – if we suspend the need to know and recognise our identities 
and the one of others in a stable and irrevocable way? Which trouble, which 
awkwardness in our sense-of-self can produce the encounter with alterity, with a 
disturbing body whose gender is for us unintelligible? How can we accept the fragility 
of our own gender that this troubling body reveals?  
 
Conclusion 




This article sought to demonstrate that, in many ways, the suppression of gender 
registration represents a better alternative to the problematic current binary 
classification than an addition of one - or more - gender categories. The dual 
dimension of gender registration is indeed discriminatory. First, it gives legitimacy to 
violent and painful re-assignation mutilations on new-borns diagnosed with an 
intersex condition. Second, it makes life within institutions, administrations and many 
social spaces very difficult for individuals who do not recognised themselves or are 
not recognized by others within the traditional gender categories. This includes 
individuals who identify as non-binary, but also trans people in transition and more 
largely people who may identify as men or women but whose gender expressions do 
not fit hegemonic gender norms. 
 
Yet adding one or more options of identifications on identity documents will 
not resolve the problems. Confronted with the paradox of specific rights, such an 
addition would probably create another biological gender without attending to the 
stigmas and discriminations affecting non-conforming gender identities and 
expressions. Butler asks, "what departures from the norm constitute something other 
than an excuse or rationale for the continuing authority of the norm," "what 
departures from the norm disrupt the regulatory process itself" (Butler, 2004). 
Suspending the practices of sorting citizens and users of public services by gender 
looks, it seems, a better departure from the norm that the more official inclusion of 
non-binary and intersex persons into the gender regulatory process. De-gendering 
civil registration and identity documents would also complicate other types of legally 
organised gender regulation in, for instance, family law or sex-segregated social 
places. Those gender regulations are not only discriminatory for gender non-
conforming individuals, they also reconduct constantly the division between the two 
traditional genders and remind us all the time that gender is a structuring dimension 
of the social world. In that sense, they give legitimacy to gender classifications and 
norms that are hindering for all genders.  
 
Thus, I finally argue that, abolishing gender registration could be part of a 
broader queer and feminist project to rethink state neutrality, a project that would 
consist in neutralising legal, administrative and institutional forms of gender 
assignations. Instead of being obliviously blind to identities and inequalities, this 
feminist neutrality would work to degender the law and institutions that structure our 
collective realities.   





Amato, V. (2016). Intersex Narratives: shifts in the Representation of Intersex Lives in North 
American Litterature and Popular Culture. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.  
Balibar, E. (2016). Des Universels : Essais et Conférences. Paris: Galilée. 
Bourdieu, P. (2001). Masculine Domination. (R. Nice, trans.) Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. (originally published in 1998).  
Brown, W. (2000). “Suffering rights as paradoxes”. Constellations, 7, 208–229.  
Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Chase, C. (1998). “Hermaphrodites with attitude: mapping the emergence of intersex 
political activism”. GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 4 (2), 189-211.  
Davis, H.F. (2017). Beyond Trans: Does Gender Matter? New York, NY: New York 
University Press. 
Davis, H.F (2014). “Sex-classification policies as transgender discrimination: An 
intersectional critique”. Perspectives on Politics, 12, 45–60. 
Diehl, A., Leite Vieira, D., Milograna Zaneti, M., Fanganiello, A., Sharan, P., Robles, 
R., De Jesus Mari, J. (2017). « Social stigma, legal and public heath barries faced by the 
third gender phenomena n Brazil, India, and Mexico: Travestis, hijras, and muxes”. 
International Journal of Social Psychiatry. 63, 389–399. 
Duggan, L. (1994). “Queering the State”. Social Text, 39, 1-14. 
Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of 
Sexuality. New-York, NY: Basic Books. 
Foucault, M. (1994). “Le vrai sexe”, in M. Foucault, Dits et Écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 954–
942 (Originally published in 1980). 
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeolodgy of Knowledge. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Fraser, N. (1995). “From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a “post-
socialist” age”. New Left Review, 212, 68–93. 
Honneth, A. (1995). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict. 
(J. Anderson, trans.). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 
Hossain, A. (2017). “The paradox of recognition: hijra, third gender and sexual rights 
in Bangladesh”. Culture, Health and Sexuality, 19, 1418–1431. 
Reviewed Article                                       International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 
97 
 
Jones, M. (2017). “Intersex Genital Mutilation - A wester version of FGM”. The 
International Journal of Children Rights, 5 (2), 396-411.  
Kosofsky Sedgwick, E. (1993). Tendencies. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Markell, P. (2003). Bound by Recognition. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Minow, M. (1990). Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law. 
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. 
Scott, J.W. (1988). Gender and the Politics of History. New-York: Columbia University 
Press.  
Scott, J.W., (1988). Deconstructing equality-versus-difference: or, the uses of 
poststructuralist theory for feminism. Feminist Studies 14 (1), 32-50. 
Shrage, L. (2012). “Does the government need to know your sex?” Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 20, 225–247.  
Spade, D. (2015). Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the 
Limits of Law, Revised and Expanded edition. Durham: Duke University Press. (Originally 
published in 2011).  
Tronto, J. (2013). Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York: New York 




i I am deeply grateful for the support of the International Fox Fellowship at Yale University. For their 
insightful comments on earlier versions of this article, I would like to thank Felix Pal, Paolo Sosa-
Villagarcia, Barbara Pohl, Anne Mishkind, and the two anonymous referees.   
ii Some of the ideas of this paper have been published in French in “L’identité peut-elle se passer de 
reconnaissance? Le cas du sexe à l’état-civil”, François Debras, Jérôme Nossent (ed.), Questions 
d’identité(s), Liège, Presse Universitaire de Liège, 2020 (forthcoming).  
